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The Effect of Cost Suppression under
Universal Health Insurance on the
Allocation of Talent and the Development of
Expertise: Cosmetic Surgery in Japan
J. Mark Ramseyer Harvard Law School
Abstract
Japanese national health insurance provides universal coverage. This system
necessarily entails a subsidy that dramatically raises the demand for medical
services. In the face of the increased demand, the government suppresses costs
by suppressing prices. Through biographical and income data on more than
4,000 Tokyo physicians, I explore the effect of this price suppression on the
allocation of talent and the development of expertise. Crucially, this national
health insurance does not cover services—like elective cosmetic surgery—
deemed medically superﬂuous. Facing price caps in the covered sector but
competitive prices in these “superﬂuous” sectors, the most talented doctors
disproportionately shift into the “superﬂuous” sectors and there invest heavily
in their expertise: cosmetic surgeons are more likely than other doctors (more
likely even than noncosmetic plastic surgeons) to have attended a more selective
medical school, to have served on a medical school faculty, to be board certiﬁed,
and to earn high incomes.
1. Introduction
Through a complex set of subsidies, the Japanese government supplies universal
health insurance. These subsidies necessarily boost demand, and the increased
demand should raise prices. As prices rise, so should aggregate health costs. Yet
health costs in Japan are low. Among the wealthy industrialized countries, they
border on the lowest.
The Japanese government suppresses costs by suppressing prices. Every other
I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Omri Ben-Shahar, John Camp-
bell, Eric Feldman, Tom Ginsburg, John Haley, Ryotaro Kato, Daniel Kessler, Curtis Milhaupt, Sam
Peltzman, Marc Rodwin, Chiaki Sato, Mark West, an anonymous referee, and participants in work-
shops at the American Law and Economics Association, Harvard University, University of Michigan,
University of Pennsylvania, and University of Tokyo. I thank the East Asian Legal Studies Program,
the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, and the John M. Olin Program in Law, Economics,
and Business of Harvard Law School for generous ﬁnancial assistance.
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year, it sets the prices it will pay for medical services, devices, and pharmaceu-
ticals, and it sets them low. One consequence of this strategy is straightforward:
physicians depreciate quality. In a wide variety of ways, they lower the quality
of the services they provide and allocate their services by queue. The effect is
well known among specialists, and I do not focus on it here.
Yet the price suppression has another effect as well: it shapes the allocation
of talent and the developmentof expertise. Necessarily,itaffectsthecareerchoices
physicians make and the investments they make in their human capital. Crucially,
the Japanese insurance system covers all services deemed medically necessary—
but only those services. As a result, doctors face suppressed prices for any “nec-
essary” services they sell but competitive prices for medically “superﬂuous” work
such as cosmetic treatments. Disproportionately, the most talented doctors
should opt to sell in the medically superﬂuous sector, where they can obtain
competitive prices; the least talented doctors should stay in the medically “nec-
essary” sector with its heavily subsidized demand curve; and the doctors in the
“superﬂuous” but competitive sector should invest more heavily than others in
specialized expertise and in the certiﬁcation of that expertise.
To test this logic, I collect biographical information on all 495 Tokyo physicians
advertising cosmetic procedures (cosmetic surgeons).
1 I then compare these men
and women against several other groups of Tokyo physicians: (a) a randomly
sampled group of Tokyo physicians in the Japan Medical Association (JMA;
about 500 doctors), (b) all Tokyo JMA physicians in the same age cohort as the
bulk of the cosmetic surgeons (about 2,200 doctors), (c) all board-certiﬁed JMA
Tokyo physicians (about 1,100 doctors), and (d) all Tokyo JMA physicians of-
fering noncosmetic plastic surgery (about 100 doctors).
The data conﬁrm what economic logic suggests. Japanese cosmetic surgeons
are more talented and better trained than other Japanese physicians—more tal-
ented and better trained even than plastic surgeons not advertising cosmetic
procedures. They are more likely to have attended one of the more prestigious
public medical schools. They are more likely to have been appointed to the
faculty of a medical school. And they are more likely to invest the time necessary
to become board certiﬁed.
Given the talent and expertise they bring, cosmetic surgeons also earn high
incomes. They earn more than other doctors generally. They earn more than other
doctors in their age cohort. And they even earn more than noncosmetic plastic
surgeons.
2. The Health Care System
2.1. Universal Health Insurance
The Japanese government adopted the current national health insurance
scheme in the early 1960s. The economy was growing rapidly, but so was the
1 I use the term “cosmetic surgeon” solely for expositional convenience. In this article, it includes
physicians offering nonsurgical cosmetic procedures (for example, dermatological treatments).
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electoral threat posed by the socialist and communist Left. In their bid for power,
these leftist parties championed European welfare state policies. Strategically, to
trim their appeal, the conservative government fashioned from existing govern-
ment health plans a universal health insurance scheme of its own.
In the more than 40 years since its adoption, the scheme has evolved, but
several sets of insurance plans lie at its core. One set of policies, covering 30.6
million people in 2004 (Kameoka 2005, pp. 8–13), comprises a network of
employer-based plans at large ﬁrms. Within this network—mandatory for all
ﬁrms that fall within its scope—employers pay insurance premiums on behalf
of their employees. Through the insurance, those employees andtheirdependents
then obtain most health care. A second program covers employees at smaller
ﬁrms (35.9 million). Still other plans cover the self-employed, the unemployed,
the retired, and so forth.
The insurers under these plans range from private ﬁrms (for the larger em-
ployers) to the Japanese government (for smaller employers) to municipal gov-
ernments (for the self-employed and the unemployed). Copayments run from
10 to 30 percent, depending on the plan, but were capped in the mid-2000s at
140,000 yen (at the close of 2005, $1.00 p 118 yen) plus 1 percent of the excess
over 466,000 yen (less is charged for low-income patients). Because the govern-
ment uses revenue from the employer-based plans to pay for the others, cross
subsidies are large (Kameoka 2005, pp. 8–13, 42).
Through this national health insurance, Japanese obtain a wide panoply of
services. Of the 31 trillion yen in 2001 health care costs, outpatient charges made
up 41 percent of that total, and hospitalization costs added another 37 percent
(Nakamura 2006, p. 32). Personnel costs (for example, doctors and nurses)
constituted 49 percent of the health care costs, and pharmaceuticals added an-
other 20 percent. Patients under age 65 generated 46 percent of the health care
costs, and those over 75 consumed 35 percent (Nakamura 2006, pp. 19, 32).
Every other year, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW) pub-
lishes an elaborate price schedule. It minutely details the prices providers may
charge for medical, hospital, and pharmaceutical treatments. In setting the prices,
its bureaucrats primarily negotiate with the JMA (Campbell and Ikegami 1998,
chap. 6). These prices are mandatory. For services billed under the national
health insurance, providers may not charge more. Other than a few exceptions
for services like private hospital rooms, neither may they charge patients sup-
plementary amounts.
And the set prices are low. According to Campbell and Ikegami (1998, p. 147),
the leading study of the Japanese health care industry, the prices average about
a quarter of the reimbursement rates in the United States. Apparently, this system
does keep costs down. As of 2003, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development estimates that Japan spent 8.0 percent of its gross domestic
product on insured health care. Canada spent 9.9 percent, France spent 10.4
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percent, Germany spent 10.9 percent, and the United States spent 15.2 percent
(Nihon iryo seisaku kiko 2007, pp. 246–47).
2
Given the inevitable variation in medical service quality, basic logic suggests
that high-quality physicians and high-reservation-pricepatientsshouldselectively
supplement the set prices with side payments. They may. According to one
estimate, patients pay about 389 billion yen in bribes, or about 1.3 percent of
the total health expenditures (Campbell and Ikegami 1998, p. 5). Because these
payments go to the few most talented physicians, they may constitute a sizeable
fraction of income for those who receive them. For the patients who pay them,
they would obviously constitute a considerable burden as well.
A few patients and doctors do abandon the system entirely. The law does not
stop physicians from charging higher prices if patients will forgo the insurance
and pay the full amount out-of-pocket. Increasingly, they do. Unfortunately,
clinics that do not bill the government do not appear in the government statistics.
A few clinics catering to expatriates have operated outside the system for years.
Those with a domestic clientele have now begun to do so as well.
2.2. Physicians and Hospitals
Licensure. Over 259,000 licensed physicians practice in Japan (2004 data;
Nihon iryo seisaku kiko 2007, pp. 232–33). At 2.0 doctors for every 1,000
potential patients, this ﬁgure falls below those for comparably wealthy countries:
2.1 for Canada, 2.3 for the United Kingdom, 2.4 for the United States, 3.4 for
France, and 3.4 for Germany (Nihon iryo seisaku kiko 2007). Physicians, in
short, are few.
Incumbent doctors complain of excess supply, but physicians are scarce be-
cause the government limits entry. As in the United States, would-be physicians
must ﬁrst enter a university medical department. Once admitted, they study 6
years and take a national licensing examination. Approximately 88 percent of
the graduates pass, and this number indicates that the bottleneck is the medical
school requirement rather than the licensing exam.
3 Before opening a practice,
new doctors then work at least 2 years in a hospital-based residency program
(Ishi ho [Physicians act], Law No. 201 of 1948, sec. 16-2).
Incomes. Japanese physicians earn modestly high incomes. According to the
MHLW,
4 in 2005 salaried physicians earned a mean of 10 million yen. At the
end-of-the-year conversion rate of 118 yen to the U.S. dollar, thatﬁguretranslates
to perhaps $90,000. In the United States (according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
2 On the problems in international comparisons of health care expenditures, see Berndt et al.
(2000).
3 For more on passage rates, see Dai 101 kai ishi kokkashiken gakko rankingu sokei hen [101st
National physician examination, rankings by school, totals] (http://venacava.seesaa.net/article/
37185957.html).
4 See Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), Chingin kozo kihon tokei chosa [Basic
statistical survey of wage structure], as reported on Nenshu rabo [Salary laboratory] (http://
www.nenshu-labo.com/sikaku_isya.htm).
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Statistics),
5 a new pediatrician in 2004 could expect a median incomeof$133,000;
an anesthesiologist with over a year’s experience could expect $322,000.
Among Japanese physicians, those who make the most run their own private
hospitals or clinics. In effect, they sell expensive hotel stays (typically to elderly
patients) at government expense. Predictably, given the incentives involved, they
keep their patients hospitalized longer than do physicians elsewhere. In 2004,
doctors kept the mean in-patient stays at 36.3 days in Japan, but at barely 13.4
days in France, 10.4 days in Germany, 7.2 days in the United Kingdom, and 6.5
days in the United States (Nihon iryo seisaku kiko 2007, pp. 242–43).
Because many physicians run pharmacies in their clinics, they also proﬁt on
the drugs that they prescribe (again at government expense). Predictably, ob-
servers complain that physicians prescribe too often. Aggregate levels do remain
in line with international levels: U.S. patients spent $702 per capita in 2003 on
pharmaceuticals, the French spent $582, the Japanese spent $509, Germans spent
$468, and Canadians spent $453 (Nihon iryo seisaku kiko 2007, pp. 217, 247,
253). Yet because the government may negotiate low prices from the pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms, the low aggregate ﬁgures may disguise the large quantities con-
sumed.
New Clinics. Disproportionately, these doctors with private hospitals and
clinics are old. They are not old because—in the language of a StanfordUniversity
study—younger physicians are not “interested in clinic-based medicine,” because
“the escalation of land prices in Japan has made the creation of clinics by young
doctors ﬁnancially prohibitive,” or because young doctors “are attracted to . . .
sophisticated medical equipment” at the bigger hospitals (Yoshikawa, Bhatta-
charya, and Vogt 1996, p. 27).
Instead, the doctors with the hospitals and clinics are old because of regulation.
Nominally to limit hospitalization costs, the Japanese government in1985capped
the number of hospital beds per medical district. As of 2005, only 10 prefectures
out of 47 had fewer beds than were allowed. All others remained beyond their
allowed capacity. Tokyo was 6 percent above its cap (106,000 beds with only
100,000 allowed), and Osaka was 16 percent above the cap (Kokuritsu shakai
hosho jinko mondai kenkyujo 2006, p. 428, table 229). In effect, the hospital
bed cap bans new construction in most areas.
Public Hospital Doctors. Some of the most talented doctors in Japan work
at university and government hospitals. Over the course of their careers, however,
many of these doctors too will shift into the private sector for the higher incomes.
At public-sector hospitals, they simply cannot earn as much as they could at
their own institutions. To earn higher incomes, they eventually need to run their
own clinics or hospitals.
Individual biographies (see, for example, Iji koron sha 2004) detail this dy-
namic. Many clinic owners came to their clinics from a career at a public-sector
5 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2008–09 Edition (http://
www.bls.gov/OCO).
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hospital. Before the ban on new beds, they could build their own clinics. In the
years since the ban, in most cities they must buy an existing clinic, build a bedless
clinic, or move beyond the national insurance system altogether.
Quality Degradation. For what they receive under this system, Japanese
patients nurse a long litany of complaints. Most represent predictable conse-
quences of a regulatory regime that pairs ﬁxed prices with heavy subsidies.
6
Given that this is a study in resource allocation rather than quality degradation,
I will not focus on these effects. Typically, however, patients complain about one
or more of the following four phenomena.
First, waits are long. Because the government limits the number of physicians,
subsidizes the cost of medical services, and suppresses the prices paid to doctors,
physicians allocate their services by queue. Most doctors take no appointments
and treat all patients on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis. When patients do make
appointments, it avails them little. According to a 2005 MHLW survey, only 45
percent of the patients who arrive at a hospital without appointments see a
doctor within 30 minutes, and another 23 percent see a doctor within the next
30 minutes. With an appointment, the fraction able to see a doctor within 30
minutes rises only to 53 percent. Patients typically consider physician quality to
be the highest at the biggest hospitals, and there they wait even longer. At the
largest hospitals, only 22 percent of patients withoutappointmentsseeaphysician
within 30 minutes, with another 22 percent seeing one in the next 30 minutes.
Thirty-two percent wait 1–2 hours, and the remaining quarter wait over 2 hours.
7
Second, visits are short. Again, because the government limits the supply of
physicians, subsidizes purchases, andsuppresses prices,physiciansmaximizetheir
incomes by seeing as many patients as possible per day. This strategy, of course,
is equivalent to spending as little time with each patient as possible. According
to a common Japanese adage, “You wait 3 hours for a 3-minute consultation.”
An exaggeration to be sure, the adage nevertheless captures the gist of a situation
that Japanese patients encounter routinely.
Third, facilities are poor. To be sure, doctors will invest in equipment if the
reimbursement rates pay them a return on their investments. Yet if they can ﬁll
their days at the speciﬁed rates with poor rather than attractive facilities, they
will offer poor facilities. And they do.
Last, specialization is minimal. A Stanford study declared that “[s]pecialty
board certiﬁcation does not exist in Japan” (Yoshikawa, Bhattacharya, and Vogt
1996, p. 27). The study overstated the point but came remarkably close to the
truth nonetheless. There are indeed boards that certify doctors in Japan, but
because physicians can ﬁll their days at government-mandated rates without
specializing, few bother (more discussion on this pointbelow).Instead,amajority
6 Obviously, readers should not take this discussion as somehow implying that the U.S. market is
one of perfect competition. For a survey of the industrial organization of the U.S.healthcareindustry,
see Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000, p. 1093).
7 For more on waiting times in hospitals, see Shinsatsu made no machi jikan [Wait time until
examination] (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jyuryo/05/kekka2.html).
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of Tokyo JMA members in 2004 (61 percent of the randomly sampled data set
described below) advertised themselves as specialists in at least two areas and
often many more. Many advertised services in combinations of ﬁelds—like in-
ternal medicine and surgery—that most physicians would not consider even
remotely related.
3. Implications for Talent and Expertise
3.1. The Logic
Consider how this universal insurance might skew the allocation of talent and
the development of expertise. The insurance does not cover all procedures.
Instead, it excludes those elective procedures thought medically most unneces-
sary. In effect, it bifurcates the medical services industry into the covered (non-
competitive and medically necessary) sector and the noncovered (competitive
and medically superﬂuous) sector. Within the covered sector, it suppresses prices
and subsidizes demand, and physicians respond by degrading quality and al-
locating service by queue. Within the noncovered sector, physicians allocate
service by quality and price.
For two reasons, this situation creates an incentive for the best doctors to
shift into the medically least necessary sectors and to invest in skills and facilities
at higher rates than do their peers. First, in the competitive sector, prices vary
by physician quality, but in the covered sector they do not. As a result, the most
talented physicians could conceivably earn higher returns in the competitive
sector through the higher prices they could charge. The less talented would earn
more in the subsidized, price-controlled sector.
Second, in the competitive sector, physicians can earn a market return on
many investments in human and physical capital. If consumers value specialized
expertise highly enough, under competition physicians will ﬁnd it worthwhile
to acquire the expertise. If consumers value the certiﬁcation of that expertise,
physicians will ﬁnd it worthwhile to obtain the certiﬁcation. And if consumers
value attractive facilities, physicians will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to build high-quality
clinics.
Three potentially observable implications follow. First, when physicians sell
their services in a competitive market, they will offer the talent and the level of
expertise, certiﬁcation, and facilities that they can proﬁtably provide at the price
patients are willing to pay. Second, when they sell their services in a market
characterized by subsidized demand and suppressed prices, they will present less
talent and offer lower levels of investment in human and physical capital. Last,
if the most talented doctors shift to the competitive sector and there make greater
investments (as the ﬁrst two hypotheses suggest), then observed incomes should
be higher in the competitive (noncovered) sector than they are in the price-
controlled (covered) sector.
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3.2. Cosmetic Surgery
Crucially, the Japanese national healthinsuranceexcludescosmeticprocedures.
To be sure, it covers corrective operations for a child burned in a ﬁre or a
passenger disﬁgured in a car crash. It does not cover cosmetic surgery for oth-
erwise healthy people.
Despite this exclusion from the national system, Japanese physicians do sell
cosmetic services. According to the MHLW, only 715 physicians practice in the
ﬁeld, and only 239 of them do so in Tokyo (2004 data; Kosei rodo sho 2006,
p. 183). But the MHLW collects data only on services covered by the national
insurance. Among cosmetic surgeons, it counts only those who handle the in-
sured burn treatments, surgeries related to accidents, and other medically nec-
essary procedures.
If you use Google to search for “cosmetic surgery,” though, you ﬁnd that 440
physicians advertise cosmetic surgery on the World Wide Web in Tokyo alone.
If you use Google to search for the two professional associations of cosmetic
surgeons, you ﬁnd that one has 667 members nationally and the other boasts
987.
8 A business-consulting group recently estimated this market at 195 billion
yen (Yano keizai kenkyujo 2006, p. 39).
These doctors offer a wide range of procedures. One of the cheapest and most
common involves eyelids. Westerners tend to have a crease in their eyelids, while
Japanese do not. Over the past 2 decades, many Japanese (particularly women)
have added that crease through surgery. The price of the operation varies. At
the massive (34 outlets nationwide) Kanagawa Clinic chain, creased eyelids cost
(depending on the method used) as little as 60,000 yen ($484) or as much as
250,000 yen.
9
Although the Kanagawa Clinic offers stylish Web sites and facilities, it does
not succeed by style alone. It also offers expertise. Its lead physician, Katsumi
Izawa, has performed over 15,000 eyelid operations. His colleague Katsuyuki
Yoshitane reports 16,000. Its head of LASIK surgery, Yoshihiro Kitazawa, came
to the clinic from the faculty of the prestigious Tokyo Medical and Dental
University. By 1996, he had already done 17,000 LASIK operations. Hesupervised
28 other physicians at the clinic’s Tokyo LASIK center, and its Osaka branch
employed another 21. In the notoriously certiﬁcation-free Japanese health care
industry, all 50 were board-certiﬁed ophthalmologists.
4. Data
To explore more systematically the effect of universal health insurance on the
allocation of talent and the development of expertise, I couple a physician’s
8 For information on the Japan Society of Aesthetic Surgery, see its Web site (http://www.jsas.or.jp).
For information on the Japan Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, see its Web site (http://www
.jsaps.com).
9 For more information on the Kanagawa Clinic, see its Web site (http://www.kanacli.net).
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biographical information with data on his or her income tax liability (see Section
4.1). I collect this material on (i) all physicians who advertiseTokyo-areacosmetic
services (about 500 doctors; see Section 4.2), (ii) a random sample of Tokyo
members of the JMA (about 500 doctors; see Section 4.3), (iii) all Tokyo JMA
members in the same age cohort as the cosmetic surgeons (about 2,200 doctors;
see Section 4.3), (iv) all board-certiﬁed Tokyo JMA members (about 1,100 doc-
tors; see Section 4.3); and (v) all Tokyo JMA noncosmetic plastic surgeons (about
100 doctors; see Section 4.3).
4.1. Income
To measure physician incomes, I take from government records the income
tax each physician paid in 2004 (Tokyo shoko risaachi 2005). This information
is available only for the highest income taxpayers (HIT). The amount of tax a
person needs to pay to trigger this public disclosure has varied over the years,
but in 2004 it was 10 million yen (at the end-of-2004 exchange rate of 102.68
yen per dollar, this was about $97,000). Because Japanese marginal tax rates peak
at 37 percent (Shotoku zei ho [Income tax act], Law No. 33 of 1965, sec. 89,
as amended by Shotokuzeito futan keigen sochi ho [Act for measures to reduce
the burden of the income and other taxes], Law No. 8 of 1999),
10 a person
paying $97,000 in taxes would have made about $390,000. After 2005, this tax
information is no longeravailable. Underthenewprivacystatute,thegovernment
may not publish the HIT list (Kojin joho no hogo ni kansuru horitsu [Act
relating to the protection of personal information], Law No. 57 of 2003). My
2004 data thus represent the last available installment of this information.
In 2004, some 73,000 Japanese paid the 10 million yen or more in taxes that
landed them on the list. For the physicians in this group, I know the amount
of taxes they actually paid. For physicians not on the list, I know that they paid
less than 10 million yen.
As a source of information, tax records inherently present several limitations.
First and most obviously, taxpayers have an incentive to underreport. With a
top marginal bracket of 37 percent, the incentive is strong. Although the Japanese
tax and prosecutors’ ofﬁces punish cheaters severely, my data will still include
some doctors who hide income.
Second, the amount of underreporting will vary with a physician’s practice.
If a doctor bills the national health insurance, the government (as payor) will
maintain records on most of the doctor’s revenue. If he or she offers elective
cosmetic surgery, the physician need never enter that income on the accounting
books. As a result, the tax data should reﬂect relatively accurately the income
of most of the doctors in the sectors covered by the national insurance. It may
signiﬁcantly understate the income of the cosmetic surgeons.
Last, to the extent that physicians earn returns from their outside investments,
10 My colleagues and I detail the calculations involved in Nakazato, Ramseyer, and Rasmusen
(2006a, 2006b).
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their taxable income will overstate their returns from medicine. Because the
oldest physicians will have accumulated the greatest wealth, they will also earn
the most investment income. As a result, the fraction of taxable income from a
medical practice should fall with age.
11
4.2. Cosmetic Surgeons
Cosmetic surgeons differ from other Tokyo doctors along several dimensions.
First, cosmetic surgeons are young. The ﬁeld itself is new, and the age of its
specialists reﬂects this. According to theMHLW,thenumberofcosmeticsurgeons
(practicing within the ambit of the national insurance) doubled from 1984 to
1994 and doubled again by 2004 (Kosei rodo sho 2006, p. 46).
The data in Table 1 compare the age distribution of all Tokyo physicians (the
information is available in aggregate form in Kosei rodo sho [2006]) with the
distribution of cosmetic surgeons. The median male Tokyo physician is 45–49
years old; the median Tokyo cosmetic surgeon is 40–44. Seventeen percent of
male Tokyo physicians are 65 or older; only 8 percent of the male Tokyo cosmetic
surgeons are that old.
Second, women are more likely than men to choose to practice cosmetic
surgery. As in the United States, women in Japan disproportionately shoulder
the burden of child care and housework. Predictably, they choose specialties with
fewer emergency procedures: ophthalmology, dermatology, and anesthesiology
(see Tables 2 and 3). At least outside the national insurance system (which covers
burn and trafﬁc accident patients), cosmetic surgery similarly involves few emer-
gencies. Among all Tokyo doctors, women are over 60 percent more likely than
men to become cosmetic surgeons (random sample; discussed in Section 4.3).
Unfortunately, the nature of this project prevents me from assembling more
than 1 year’s data. Because cosmetic surgeons operate outside of the national
insurance system, the government does not collect data on them. Because mem-
bership is voluntary, neither do the professional associations. To locate physicians
hoping to sell cosmetic surgery, I thus turn to the World Wide Web, on which
most cosmetic surgeons advertise.
12 The constantly updated nature of the Web,
however, prevents me from retrospectively collecting data on physicians who
sold cosmetic surgery in the past. Unfortunately, the recent privacy protection
11 For further information on the income tax system andthese data,seethemoredetaileddiscussion
in Nakazato, Ramseyer, and Rasmusen (2006a, 2006b). Even if a physician paid the full amount of
taxes owed, he or she could skirt its disclosure through one of two tactics. The doctor could pay a
penalty and submit the return late. On its list, the tax ofﬁce includedonlythosehigh-incometaxpayers
who ﬁled within 2 weeks of the March 15 return deadline. By ﬁling after April 1, the doctor could
avoid publication of his or her name. Alternatively, the doctor could ﬁle an initial return thatincluded
only income below the amount that triggered disclosure and then submit an amended return with
the remaining income. The tax ofﬁce compiled its list from the initial returns, and, thus, a doctor
could avoid publication of his or her name this way as well. I do not know how many taxpayers
used either strategy.
12 I located 440 Tokyo physicians advertising cosmetic procedures on the World Wide Web. I
included an additional 55 physicians who listed themselves in the Japan Medical Association (JMA)
directory as offering cosmetic procedures.
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Table 1
Age Distribution of Tokyo Physicians
Age
All JMA Members Cosmetic Surgeons
Male Female Male Female Male Female
X 24 41 (.2) 38 (.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
25–29 2,448 (9.2) 1,645
a (20.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 10 (3.7) 8 (9.9)
30–34 3,433 (12.9) 1,512 (19.1) 1 (.2) 4 (5.8) 24 (8.8) 15 (18.5)
35–39 3,340 (12.6) 1,114
b (14.0) 10 (2.2) 5 (7.2) 32 (11.7) 25
a,b (30.9)
40–44 3,663
a (13.8) 951 (12.0) 43 (9.3) 5 (7.2) 72
a,b (26.4) 16 (19.8)
45–49 3,404
b (12.8) 725 (9.1) 54 (11.6) 10 (14.5) 53 (19.4) 9 (11.1)
50–54 2,578 (9.7) 480 (6.1) 52 (11.2) 10
a (14.5) 28 (10.2) 1 (1.2)
55–59 1,978 (7.5) 380 (4.8) 53 (11.4) 6
b (8.7) 17 (6.2) 2 (2.5)
60–64 1,173 (4.4) 218 (2.7) 47
b (10.1) 3 (4.3) 16 (5.8) 2 (2.5)
65–69 1,007 (3.8) 164 (2.1) 46 (9.9) 5 (7.2) 9 (3.3) 1 (1.2)
70–74 1,046 (3.9) 190 (2.4) 54 (11.6) 2 (2.9) 5 (1.8) 0 (0)
75–79 1,547 (5.8) 292 (3.7) 70
a (15.1) 7 (10.1) 4 (1.5) 2 (2.5)
80–84 639 (2.4) 143 (1.8) 27 (5.8) 9 (13.0) 3 (1.1) 0 (0)
x 85 234 (.9) 80 (1.0) 7 (1.5) 3 (4.3) 0( 0 ) 0( 0 )
Total 26,531 7,932 464 69 273 80
Mean age 48.2 42.6 61.7 58.9 46.4 39.4
Sources. The data on all physicians are from Kosei rodo sho (2006) and represent aggregate statistics
distributed by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare; the data on randomly sampled Japan Medical
Association (JMA) members are from Iji koron sha (2004); the data on cosmetic surgeons are from Iji
koron sha (2004) and a World Wide Web search for Tokyo physicians who advertise cosmetic procedures.
Note. Values are the number of physicians, with percentages in parentheses.
aModal group.
bMedian group.
statute prevents me from obtaining any income data based on tax liabilities in
the future.
4.3. Reference Groups
For a reference group against which to compare cosmetic surgeons, I turn to
the JMA. I do this reluctantly, as the practice introduces several biases. The
association does not include all physicians. While Japan has 270,371 licensed
physicians, the JMA includes only164,110 (61 percent).
13While34,463physicians
work in Tokyo, the JMA has only 19,418 (56 percent). Crucially, however, mi-
crolevel information on all Japanese doctors is simply unavailable.
Use of the JMA database introduces at least three biases relevant here. First—
and most fundamental—JMA members are old. While the median male Tokyo
physician is 45–49, the median male JMA member is 60–64. While the modal
male Tokyo physician is 40–44, the modal JMA physician is 75–79. And while
17 percent of male Tokyo physicians are 65 or older, fully 44 percent of the male
JMA members are (Table 1).
13 Data in this section on total physicians are for 2004 and are from Kosei rodo sho (2006), which
provides the information in aggregate form. Data on aggregate JMA membership for 2006 are from
Nihon ishikai kaiinsu chosa [Survey of JMA members] (http://www.med.or.jp/jma/gaiyou/mem20
.html).
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Table 2
Most Common Specialties for Male Physicians in Japan, 2004
Specialty
Percentage of All
Male Physicians
Percentage Male
in the Specialty
Internal medicine 29.2 85.1
General surgery 10.3 95.4
Orthopedic surgery 8.4 96.3
Pediatrics 4.7 68.8
Psychiatry 4.6 81.5
Gastroenterology 4.3 89.5
Cardiology 3.8 90.3
Source. Kosei rodo sho (2006).
Table 3
Most Common Specialties for Female Physicians in Japan, 2004
Specialty
Percentage of All
Female Physicians
Percentage Female
in the Specialty
Internal medicine 26.0 14.9
Ophthalmology 10.9 36.8
Pediatrics 10.9 31.2
Dermatology 7.0 38.0
Psychiatry 5.3 18.5
Obstetrics/gynecology 5.3 21.8
Anesthesiology 4.4 29.1
Source. Kosei rodo sho (2006).
Second, the JMA disproportionately recruits its members from among those
doctors who own and operate their own clinics or hospitals. According to the
government, 76,897 (28 percent) of all Japanese physicians operate their own
hospitals or clinics; of all Tokyo physicians, 8,878 (26 percent) do. As the JMA
Web site claims 84,562 owner-operators in its membership, either the MHLW
is undercounting owners or the JMA is overcounting. Either way, most owner-
operators must have joined the JMA. Within Tokyo, the JMA claims 9,909 owner-
operators. Again, most owner-operators must be in the JMA.
Last, JMA members are male. Women attended medical school less commonly
decades ago and less frequently own hospitals or clinics today than do men.
Given that JMA members are older and more likely than most doctors to own
their own facilities, they are also more likely to be male. In Tokyo, 77 percent
of all physicians are male. In my JMA sample, 87 percent are.
Random Sample. I ﬁrst compare the cosmetic surgeons against a random
sample of 495 JMA members. To address the greater likelihood that the JMA
members own their own clinics (and differ on other omitted variables), as ap-
propriate I limit the cosmetic surgeons in the comparison to those 181 physicians
who are also members of the JMA. To address any bias caused by the greater
likelihood that the JMA members are male, as appropriate I limit the comparison
to men.
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Age-Matched Cohort. I then compare cosmetic surgeons against a group of
age-matched JMA physicians. As I noted above, JMA members are much older
than cosmetic surgeons: only 84 cosmetic surgeons are over age 50, while only
73 JMA members in the random sample who are not cosmetic surgeons are
under age 50.
To address the problems caused by the largely nonoverlapping ages of the
physicians in the two data sets, I collect biographical and tax information on
JMA doctors closer in age to the cosmetic surgeons. The cosmetic surgeons at
the 25th and 75th age percentiles were born in 1955 and 1967, respectively. As
a comparison group for these doctors, I assemble biographical and tax data on
all 2,182 Tokyo JMA members born between those years. Again, as appropriate,
I limit the comparisons to cosmetic surgeons who are members of the JMA or
to those who are male.
Board-Certiﬁed Physicians. Doctors in the JMA are older than other doctors,
and older doctors seemless likely than otherstohaveobtainedboardcertiﬁcation.
To explore certiﬁcation patterns more closely, I collect biographical and tax
information on all 1,133 board-certiﬁed Tokyo JMA doctors.
Plastic Surgeons. I assemble biographical and tax information on all 93
noncosmetic Tokyo plastic surgeons in the JMA. Subject to a few exceptions,
14
most cosmetic surgeons are plastic surgeons who perform medically nonessential
operations for cosmetic purposes. In Japan, the distinction between cosmetic
and plastic surgeons thus tracks the market in which they choose to sell: cosmetic
surgeons sell plastic surgery in the uninsured, competitive market, while the
noncosmetic plastic surgeons sell plastic surgery in the insured, price-regulated
market. The similarity between the two groups consequently lets me contrast
the qualiﬁcations and incomes of otherwise comparable physicians.
5. Talent and Expertise
In the following section, I consider whether talented physicians dispropor-
tionately select into cosmetic surgery and, once there, invest at higher levels in
specialized expertise. I take talent ﬁrst and expertise second. I begin with the
description of the variables in Table 4, give summary statistics in Table 5, and
turn then to the regression results in Table 6.
5.1. Summary Statistics
Medical School. I offer two indices of physician quality: whether a physician
attended a public medical school and whether that physician spent time on the
faculty of a university. All else being equal, the public Japanese medical schools
are more selective and prestigious than the private ones. According to one na-
tional network of exam-preparation centers, only six private universities (led by
14 Some cosmetic procedures (for example, treatment for burns and trafﬁc accidents) are medically
necessary by most standards.
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Table 4
Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Tax Liability 2004 The physician’s tax liability (in thousands of yen) in 2004 if he or she is
on the list of highest income taxpayers and 10,000 if not on the list
Tax Liability 2003 The physician’s tax liability in 2003, conditional on appearing on the
highest income taxpayers list in 2004
HIT One if the doctor appeared on the list of highest income taxpayers in
2004 and zero otherwise
Cosmetic Surgery One if a physician advertises services on the World Wide Web or in the
Japan Medical Association directory as a Tokyo-area cosmetic surgeon
and zero otherwise; the variable obviously does not capture expertise
but does capture the decision to try to sell services in this market
Public University One if a physician attended one of the 50 public medical schools and zero
otherwise; the public schools are generally more selective than are the
30 private medical schools
JMA Member One if a physician is a member of the Japan Medical Association and zero
otherwise
Faculty Experience One if a physician has worked on the faculty of a medical school
(including service as a joshu [research associate] or an adjunct) and
zero otherwise; the variable thus indicates whether the doctor impressed
scholars enough for them to appoint him or her to the faculty
Hospital Physician One if a physician is afﬁliated with a hospital and zero otherwise
Board Certiﬁcation One if a physician is a board-certiﬁed specialist and zero otherwise
Age The physician’s age estimated from the year of school graduation if the
year of birth is unavailable
Sex One if a physician is male and zero if female
Keio and Jikeikai Universities) maintain more selective medical schools than the
bottom-ranked public university, Gunma University (see Yoyogi zeminaaru
2007).
Table 5 shows that, whereas 41 percent of the cosmetic surgeons studied
medicine at a public university, only 35 percent of the JMA random sample did.
Yet many of the private medical schools date from the 1970s, and most of the
JMA physicians attended medical school long before that time. Amongphysicians
born between 1955 and 1967, 42 percent of the cosmetic surgeons studied at a
public medical school; only 29 percent of the JMA doctors did. And among the
male doctors in the 1955–67 cohort, the contrast is more pronounced still: 46
percent of the cosmetic surgeons attended a public medical school, but only 31
percent of the other male doctors did.
One might expect subspecialties to attract the most talented doctors, but the
advantages of cosmetic surgery may appear even against others in plastic surgery.
While 41 percent of the cosmetic surgeons attended a public university, only 35
percent of the noncosmetic plastic surgeons did. While 42 percent of the cosmetic
surgeons in the 1955–67 cohort attended a public school, only 29 percent of the
other plastic surgeons in the cohort did. And while 46 percent of the male
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cosmetic surgeons in that cohort attended a public school, only 31 percent of
the other male plastic surgeons in the cohort did.
15
Faculty Experience. As in the United States, medical schoolsinJapantypically
recruit their faculty from among their beststudents.TheTokyocosmeticsurgeons
were far more likely to have spent time on medical school faculties than were
the others: 23 percent of the cosmetic surgeons had spent time on a university
faculty; only 15 percent of the randomly sampled JMA members had done so.
Among physicians born in 1955–67, the contrast in faculty experience is
greater. Of the cosmetic surgeons, 32 percent had served on a faculty, but only
12 percent of the noncosmetic JMA members had. Of the men in this age cohort,
34 percent of the cosmetic surgeons had served on a faculty, but only 12 percent
of the others had. And of the board-certiﬁed physicians in the age cohort, 48
percent of the cosmetic surgeons had served on a faculty, but only 33 percent
of the others had.
The differences persist even when noncosmetic plastic surgeons are used in
the comparison. Of plastic surgeons not advertising cosmetic services, only 6
percent had faculty experience (in contrast to 23 percent of the cosmetic sur-
geons). Of those in the 1955–67 birth-year cohort, only 7 percent had faculty
experience (in contrast to 32 percent of the cosmetic surgeons). And of the men
in that cohort, only 9 percent had faculty experience (in contrast to 34 percent
of the cosmetic surgeons).
16
Board Certiﬁcation. Cosmetic surgeons are much more likely than other
doctors to obtain board certiﬁcation. Most Japanese doctors never pursue board-
certiﬁed expertise. Because they are able to ﬁll their days with patients even
without having certiﬁcation, they do not bother getting it. Cosmetic surgeons,
however, sell their services in a market in which price depends on perceived
value, informational asymmetries plague physician claims about their expertise,
and the patient pays the entire cost of any procedure.
In that environment, cosmetic surgeons apparently ﬁnd it proﬁtable both to
invest in specialized expertise and to obtain third-party certiﬁcation of that
expertise. Among the randomly sampled JMA members, only 10 percent were
board certiﬁed; among cosmetic surgeons, a full 43 percent were. In the 1955–67
birth-year cohort, the contrast was 27 percent (noncosmetic) to 58 percent
(cosmetic). And among the men in that cohort, the contrast was 26 percent
(noncosmetic) to 58 percent (cosmetic).
Again, the contrast continues even between the cosmetic surgeons and the
noncosmetic plastic surgeons. Only 16 percentof allnoncosmeticplasticsurgeons
15 Of these contrasts between cosmetic surgeons and noncosmetic plastic surgeons, the second is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level by a one-tailed test. The others are not statistically
signiﬁcant. On the statistical signiﬁcance of the differences between cosmetic surgeons and other
doctors generally, see the results of the regressions in Table 6.
16 All of the differences between cosmetic surgeons and noncosmeticplasticsurgeonsarestatistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. On the signiﬁcance of the differences between cosmetic surgeons
and other doctors generally, see the results of the regressions in Table 6.
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were board certiﬁed, while 43 percent of the cosmetic surgeons were. Only 16
percent of those in the 1955–67 birth-year cohort were certiﬁed, while 58 percent
of the cosmetic surgeons were. And only 18 percent of the men in that cohort
were certiﬁed, while 58 percent of the cosmetic surgeons were.
17
The typical cosmetic surgeon obtained certiﬁcation in general plastic (rather
than speciﬁcally cosmetic) surgery. Within cosmetic surgery itself, two rival pro-
fessional associations also certify expertise: the Japan Society of Aesthetic Plastic
Surgery and the Japan Society of Aesthetic Surgery. Perhaps because of problems
stemming from the competition between the two groups, or perhaps because
certiﬁcation from an older and better established group provides greater cred-
ibility, cosmetic surgeons tend to turn to plastic surgery for their certiﬁcation.
18
Others in cosmetic medicine obtain certiﬁcation in ﬁelds like dermatology or
ophthalmology.
5.2. Regression Results
In Table 6, I regress Board Certiﬁcation on a varietyofphysiciancharacteristics.
The coefﬁcient on Cosmetic Surgery is overwhelmingly statistically signiﬁcant:
cosmetic surgeons are substantially more likely than others to obtain board
certiﬁcation. Those who served on a university faculty are similarly likely to
obtain certiﬁcation. These results hold true whether I compare JMA cosmetic
surgeons against the randomly selected doctors (regression [1]), whether I com-
pare all cosmetic surgeons born between 1955 and 1967 against JMA doctors in
the same age cohort (regression [2]), and whether I limit the data to men
(regressions [3] and [4]).
In Table 6, I also regress Cosmetic Surgery on physiciancharacteristics.Because
the decision to obtain board certiﬁcation is endogenous tothedecisiontopractice
in cosmetic surgery, I omit the certiﬁcation variable. As the summary statistics
in Table 5 suggest, those who attended a public medical school and who served
on a university faculty are more likely than other doctors to become cosmetic
surgeons: the coefﬁcient on Public University is strongly statistically signiﬁcant
in three of the four regressions, and the coefﬁcient on Faculty Experience is
strongly statistically signiﬁcant in all of them. Note that this ﬁnding holds true
even when I restrict the database to board-certiﬁed physicians (regression [7]).
17 The differences between the cosmetic surgeons and the noncosmetic plastic surgeons are all
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. On the signiﬁcance of the differences between cosmetic
surgeons and other doctors generally, see the results of the regressions in Table 6.
18 For certiﬁcation standards, see Senmon i shikaku no shutoku narabi ni koshin joken [Require-
ments for the acquisition or renewal of specialty certiﬁcation] (http://www.jsprs.or.jp/senmon
/index.htm). My search for cosmetic surgeons included a search of the certiﬁcation rosters for the
two medical societies speciﬁcally focused on cosmetic surgery. The certiﬁcation roster for the Tokyo
area was not available from the Japan Society for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, and I was left
with only the certiﬁcation information provided directly by the physicians themselves in the JMA
directory or on their Web sites. Obviously, this situation creates a potential bias. In fact, however,
most cosmetic surgeons were also board certiﬁed in a ﬁeld other than cosmetic surgery. Even if I
ignore certiﬁcation by the two cosmetic surgery societies, the certiﬁcation rate for cosmetic surgeons
falls only from 43 percent to 40 percent.
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6. Income
By the logic above, talented doctors may choose cosmetic surgery because of
the opportunity to earn a ﬁnancial return on their higher-than-average talent.
Once in the ﬁeld, they may invest in specialized expertise, again because of the
chance to earn a return on that expertise. Earning returns that other physicians
do not, they should report higher incomes. They do.
6.1. Summary Statistics
Some cosmetic surgeons are indeed rich. Of the more than 4,000 Tokyodoctors
in the pooled data set, seven of the 10 with the highest incomes were cosmetic
surgeons (Table 7). These high incomes are not an aberration. Eight of the 2004
top 10 (ﬁve of the seven cosmetic surgeons) earned enough in 2003 to appear
on the HIT list (that is, make $390,000 or more) that year too, and most of
them placed high on the 2003 list. Indeed, Watabiki, Marumoto, Kitamura,
Hirohi, and Nomura (three of them cosmetic surgeons and none of them older
than 45) had already appeared on the HIT list at least four other times.
Not only do the most successful cosmetic surgeons dominate the top-10 in-
come list but cosmetic surgeons in general appear on the HIT list in large
numbers. Granted, according to the data presented in Table 5, 14 percent of the
495 randomly sampled JMA members appear on the list, but only 12 percent
of all Tokyo cosmetic surgeons do. Recall, however, that the JMA members are
much older than the cosmetic surgeons. Of those cosmetic surgeons in the JMA,
20 percent appear on the HIT list. Of physicians born between 1955 and 1967,
15 percent of the cosmetic surgeons make the list, but only 10 percent of the
others do. Of the men born between 1955 and 1967, 19 percent of the cosmetic
surgeons appear on the list, but only 10 percent of the others do.
Specialists earn more than generalists in the United States, of course, but
Japanese cosmetic surgeons also earn more than their specialist peers. Take the
plastic surgeons who choose not to advertise cosmetic services. Whereas 12
percent of the JMA cosmetic surgeons appear on the HIT list, only 10 percent
of the other plastic surgeons do (Table 5). Within the 1955–67 birth-year cohort,
15 percent of the cosmetic surgeons appear on the list, but only 9 percent of
the other plastic surgeons do. And among the men in that cohort, 19 percent
of the cosmetic surgeons appear on the list, but only 4 percent of the other
plastic surgeons do.
19
6.2. Regression Results
In Table 8, I conﬁrm this logic more systematically. For these regressions, I
take as my dependent variable a physician’s tax liability in 2004. Because for a
19 The last difference between the cosmetic and noncosmetic plastic surgeons, but not the other
physicians, is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. For the statistical signiﬁcanceofthedifferencesbetween
cosmetic and noncosmetic surgeons generally, see the regression results in Table 8.
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 10:45:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions516
T
a
b
l
e
7
H
i
g
h
-
I
n
c
o
m
e
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
s
:
P
o
o
l
e
d
S
a
m
p
l
e
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
R
a
n
k
,
2
0
0
4
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
R
a
n
k
,
2
0
0
3
T
a
x
p
a
y
e
r
R
a
n
k
,
2
0
0
4
N
a
m
e
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
F
i
e
l
d
2
0
0
4
T
a
x
(
1
0
0
0
s
o
f
Y
e
n
)
A
g
e
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
S
c
h
o
o
l
B
o
a
r
d
C
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
1
1
0
2
F
.
U
m
e
z
a
w
a
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
3
1
3
,
7
9
6
7
0
K
e
i
o
Y
e
s
2
1
2
2
5
H
.
W
a
t
a
b
i
k
i
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
2
0
3
,
9
8
6
4
5
K
a
g
o
s
h
i
m
a
N
o
3
3
2
8
1
K
.
M
a
r
u
m
o
t
o
O
p
h
t
h
a
l
m
o
l
o
g
y
1
7
4
,
4
9
3
4
2
T
o
k
y
o
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
N
o
4
2
3
4
6
Y
.
K
i
t
a
m
u
r
a
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
1
5
9
,
6
4
7
4
1
J
i
k
e
i
Y
e
s
5
3
1
1
,
3
6
6
T
.
H
i
r
o
h
i
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
7
8
,
8
3
2
4
5
Y
a
m
a
n
a
s
h
i
N
o
6
4
1
,
5
8
4
Y
.
K
o
m
u
r
o
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
7
3
,
5
5
8
4
6
S
h
o
w
a
N
o
7
1
4
2
,
0
1
9
Y
.
I
k
e
d
a
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
6
5
,
7
2
3
3
5
K
y
o
r
i
n
N
o
8
2
,
4
0
5
M
.
B
o
k
u
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
5
9
,
7
3
0
Y
e
s
9
1
0
2
,
7
0
4
H
.
O
y
a
m
a
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
m
e
d
i
c
i
n
e
5
6
,
4
4
9
4
7
T
e
i
k
y
o
N
o
1
0
8
2
,
8
4
2
Y
.
N
o
m
u
r
a
S
u
r
g
e
r
y
5
4
,
9
1
6
4
4
N
i
h
o
n
N
o
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
D
a
t
a
o
n
J
a
p
a
n
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
I
j
i
k
o
r
o
n
s
h
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
;
d
a
t
a
o
n
c
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
o
n
s
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
I
j
i
k
o
r
o
n
s
h
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
a
n
d
a
W
o
r
l
d
W
i
d
e
W
e
b
s
e
a
r
c
h
;
i
n
c
o
m
e
d
a
t
a
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
T
o
k
y
o
s
h
o
k
o
r
i
s
a
a
c
h
i
(
2
0
0
5
)
.
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 10:45:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions517
T
a
b
l
e
8
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
n
t
s
o
f
I
n
c
o
m
e
f
o
r
T
o
k
y
o
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
s
:
T
o
b
i
t
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
S
u
r
g
e
r
y
1
1
,
8
8
3

(
1
.
7
6
)
9
,
5
0
5
*
(
2
.
5
5
)
1
3
,
0
9
0
*
*
(
3
.
1
9
)
2
0
,
7
8
9
*
*
(
4
.
6
4
)
7
,
5
4
1

(
1
.
9
1
)
P
u
b
l
i
c
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
1
8
.
5
(
.
0
0
)

3
,
5
6
4
(
1
.
2
9
)

4
,
3
7
9
(
1
.
4
4
)

3
,
5
1
2
(
1
.
2
4
)

1
,
8
3
6
(
.
6
4
)
1
,
8
3
9
(
.
1
2
)
F
a
c
u
l
t
y
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
2
,
6
1
5
(
.
4
2
)
1
,
3
7
4
(
.
3
8
)
1
,
6
6
9
(
.
4
2
)
3
,
0
3
8
(
.
8
1
)
5
,
9
4
8
(
1
.
5
8
)

2
4
,
4
5
0
(
1
.
3
6
)
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
5
,
2
1
6
(
.
8
2
)

7
,
4
8
5
(
.
9
9
)

6
,
5
8
0
(
.
8
2
)

5
,
7
6
4
(
.
7
5
)

1
,
5
9
0
(
.
2
2
)
B
o
a
r
d
C
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n

9
,
9
5
2
(
1
.
4
1
)

3
,
7
1
9
(
1
.
2
7
)

3
,
9
9
6
(
1
.
2
2
)

3
,
9
3
6
(
1
.
3
2
)

6
,
8
3
8
*
(
2
.
1
7
)
5
,
1
0
6
(
.
3
2
)
A
g
e
7
5
1
(
.
4
3
)
1
4
,
5
7
8
(
1
.
5
2
)
1
9
,
3
5
2

(
1
.
8
0
)
1
3
,
5
7
3
(
1
.
3
7
)
1
7
,
3
0
9

(
1
.
6
7
)
5
1
,
9
3
8
(
.
9
0
)
A
g
e
S
q
u
a
r
e
d

1
2
.
0
(
.
8
2
)

1
6
0
(
1
.
4
7
)

2
1
7

(
1
.
7
7
)

1
5
1
(
1
.
3
5
)

1
8
7
(
1
.
5
9
)

5
8
8
(
.
8
9
)
S
e
x
1
2
,
4
8
1
(
1
.
3
8
)
4
,
8
2
1
(
1
.
3
9
)
3
,
2
9
9
(
.
9
5
)
1
,
5
3
9
(
.
4
4
)
5
8
,
8
4
9

(
1
.
9
1
)
J
M
A
M
e
m
b
e
r
4
8
,
3
8
2
*
*
(
2
.
7
8
)
N
4
9
7
1
,
5
2
8
1
,
2
9
6
1
,
4
3
1
1
,
5
2
8
1
7
7
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
D
a
t
a
o
n
J
a
p
a
n
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
(
J
M
A
)
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
I
j
i
k
o
r
o
n
s
h
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
;
d
a
t
a
o
n
c
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
o
n
s
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
I
j
i
k
o
r
o
n
s
h
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
a
n
d
a
W
o
r
l
d
W
i
d
e
W
e
b
s
e
a
r
c
h
;
i
n
c
o
m
e
d
a
t
a
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
T
o
k
y
o
s
h
o
k
o
r
i
s
a
a
c
h
i
(
2
0
0
5
)
.
N
o
t
e
.
T
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
g
i
v
e
t
h
e
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
v
a
l
u
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
r
e
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
F
o
r
a
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
e
x
c
e
p
t
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
5
)
,
t
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
T
a
x
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
2
0
0
4
;
f
o
r
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
5
)
,
t
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
T
a
x
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
2
0
0
3
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
a
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
t
e
r
m
.
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
1
)
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
s
J
M
A
c
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
o
n
s
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
a
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
d
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
J
M
A
.
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
(
2
)
–
(
6
)
a
r
e
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
t
o
p
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
s
b
o
r
n
1
9
5
5
–
6
7
.
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
3
)
i
s
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
t
o
m
a
l
e
s
,
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
4
)
t
o
J
M
A
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
,
a
n
d
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
6
)
t
o
c
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
s
u
r
g
e
o
n
s
.
N
o
t
e
t
h
a
t
i
n
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
6
)
,
T
o
b
i
t
w
o
u
l
d
n
o
t
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
t
h
e
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
f
o
r
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
P
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
f
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
C
o
s
m
e
t
i
c
S
u
r
g
e
r
y
w
i
t
h
A
g
e
,
A
g
e
S
q
u
a
r
e
d
,
a
n
d
S
e
x
)
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
R
a
m
s
e
y
e
r
(
2
0
0
7
,
t
a
b
l
e
5
)
.

S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
t
h
e
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
.
*
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
t
h
e
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
.
*
*
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
t
h
e
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
.
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 10:45:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions518 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
majority of the doctors I know only that they paid less than 10 million yen, I
use a Tobit model.
20
I begin with the contrast to the random sample of JMA physicians (regression
[1]). Because JMA doctors differ from others along several unobserved dimen-
sions (most important, ownership of a clinic), I limit cosmetic surgeons to those
in the JMA.
21 Among JMA members, cosmetic surgeons do indeed pay higher
taxes than the others do—about 12 million yen more. The results for the other
variables are not statistically signiﬁcant, although men probably earn more than
women.
As I discussed earlier, however, the randomly sampled JMA doctors are much
older than the cosmetic surgeons. Suppose then that we limit the data set to all
physicians born between 1955 and 1967 (regression [2]). The statistical signif-
icance of the coefﬁcient on Cosmetic Surgery dramatically increases. If we limit
the data set to men born during this period, both the statistical signiﬁcance and
the economic magnitude of the coefﬁcient increase further still (regression [3]).
As one would expect, Age and Age Squared indicate that incomes increase with
age, but at a declining rate. If we limit the cosmetic surgeons to JMA members
(as we did in regression [1]) but maintain the 1955–67 birth-year restriction,
the contrasts between cosmetic surgeons and the others again increase (regression
[4]). And even if we use Tax Liability 2003 rather than Tax Liability 2004 as the
dependent variable, cosmetic surgeons retain their advantage (regression [5]).
22
Members of the JMA are much more likely than other physicians to own their
own clinics. In turn, the taxable incomes of those who own their own clinics
should include a return on the investments (both tangible and intangible) they
have made in those establishments. Because they earn returns on investments
that others have not made, they should earn higher incomes. In regression (6),
I compare the incomes of cosmetic surgeons in the JMA against those not in
the association. According totheresults,amongcosmeticsurgeonsborn1955–67,
JMA members do indeed earn higher incomes than others do.
The largest puzzle in the results shown in Table 8 concerns the apparent
absence of any premium to board certiﬁcation. Instead, the coefﬁcient on Board
Certiﬁcation is generally negative, and in one regression it is statistically signif-
icantly so. By logic, whether in a cosmetic ﬁeld or not, physicians should invest
in specialized expertise only if they earn a return on this investment. Because
they earn a return that others do not, they should report higher incomes.
20 A physician will choose a specialty with an eye to the expected income, of course, and this
choice makes Cosmetic Surgery endogenous. To deal with the endogeneity, inregressionsnotreported
here, I instrument Cosmetic Surgery by Age, Age Squared, and Sex. The results conﬁrm the high
incomes for cosmetic surgeons. The results appear in Ramseyer (2007, table 5).
21 Without this limitation, the coefﬁcient on Cosmetic Surgery is statistically insigniﬁcant, and this
ﬁnding is consistent with the higher values for high-income tax for the random sample in Table 5.
22 To explore whether outliers drive these results, I recalculated regressions (2), (3), and (4) with
Logged Tax Liability as the dependent variable. The t-statistic on Cosmetic Surgery dropped to 1.9,
2.62, and 3.87, respectively. If I omit the ﬁve highest income physicians from the calculation, the t-
statistic on Cosmetic Surgery drops to 1.19, 1.91, and 2.83, respectively.
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Recall, however, that although no clinic ownership variable appears in the
data, half of the JMA members own their clinics. What is more, given the
government restrictions on new clinics (described above) and the stratospheric
Japanese estate taxes on cash bequests, these clinic owners often transfer their
clinics to their children before death. Plausibly, doctors who acquire clinics while
young many choose to focus their efforts on learning to run the sometimes
substantial business establishments. By contrast, the doctors who choose instead
to become board certiﬁed may also be those without personal clinics. They may
invest in their specialized expertise to compete against their peers withestablished
clinics. If all of this is true, then a regression of income on Board Certiﬁcation
that omits a clinic ownership variable could easily yield no statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient on certiﬁcation.
6.3. Implications
Contrast with the United States. Cosmetic surgeons earn high incomes in
the United States as well, of course. They invest years in specialized training,
and they earn a return that reﬂects in part the returns on that human capital
investment (see, for example, Dranove and Satterthwaite 1991, p. 52). The sit-
uation is similar in Japan. Talented doctors enter the ﬁeld,theyacquirespecialized
skills, they certify those skills, and they earn a return that reﬂects their superior
talent and expertise.
But the United States and Japan do differ, and the contrast appears not among
cosmetic surgeons; instead, it appears among the other physicians. While cos-
metic surgeons invest in board-certiﬁed expertise, other physicians do not. Even
other physicians in plastic surgery—a ﬁeld demanding roughly the same skills—
do not. Cosmetic surgery attracts talented physicians. But, again, even plastic
surgery—which presents the same intellectual challenges—does not.
In both countries, cosmetic surgeons earn incomes that reﬂect the talent and
investments they bring to the job. Yet U.S. physicians in other ﬁelds invest heavily
in specialized expertise too, while their Japanese peers invest much less. Pre-
dictably, given these conditions, although cosmetic surgeons earn high incomes
in both countries, physicians in other ﬁelds earn relative incomes in Japan that
bear no relation to their relative incomes in the United States.
23
Selection out of Medicine. In fact, these data understate the extent to which
the price controls distort career choices. Logically, the controls will not skew just
a physician’s choice of specialty: they will skew a talented student’s more basic
career choice. More speciﬁcally, they will steer the most talented science students
away from any career in medicine.
23 For the relative incomes of physicians in other ﬁelds in the two countries, see Ramseyer (2007,
table 3). Cosmetic surgeons may be unusually talented in the United States as well (see Dranove
and Satterthwaite 1991, p. 67; Marder and Willke 1991, p. 276). Yet in the United States, other
subspecialities (for example, noncosmetic plastic surgery) would attract similarly talented physicians.
In Japan, that apparently does not happen. On the recent increase in the popularity of cosmetic
practice in the United States, see Singer (2008).
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Speculative evidence (but it is only speculative; the question is obviously
beyond the scope of this article) consistent with this broader effect appears in
the relative attractiveness of engineering and medicine. Forty-seven universities
maintain both engineering and medical schools. The seven worst universities
have bad schools in both ﬁelds. But among the other 40, the relativeattractiveness
of medicine falls as the quality of the university rises.
Consider the correlation among the 40 universities between (i) the selectivity
of the medical school and (ii) the ratio of the selectivity of theuniversity’smedical
school to the selectivity of the university’s engineering school (with selectivity
measured by Yoyogi zeminaaru [2007]). The coefﬁcient is strongly negative
(.60) and statistically signiﬁcant at more than the 99 percent level. The better
the students at a university, the less attractive a medical career becomes when
compared with an engineering career.
Welfare Losses. Do Japanese consumers lose when their best doctors migrate
into cosmetic surgery? Perhaps cosmetic work yields large returns to unusually
high levels of judgment, creativity, and expertise. Perhaps consumers perceive
these large differences between high- and moderate-quality cosmetic surgery.
And perhaps consumers value the highest quality work highly enough to pay
the prices necessary to bring talented doctors into the ﬁeld.
Unfortunately, we do not know—and we do not know because the Japanese
health care market generates no comparable price signals. Consumers may value
the difference between high- and moderate-quality work in neurosurgery too,
but the universal insurance prevents them from bidding for the best surgeons.
They may or may not want their best doctors in cosmetic surgery rather than
neurosurgery, but under the current system we have no way to know.
And yet we have reason at least to suspect that Japanese consumers suffer a
substantial welfare loss. To be sure, even if consumers did prefer to see their
medical talent in neurosurgery rather than cosmetic surgery, they would not
incur a large loss from the migration of 500 talented doctors into the latter.
Instead, they potentially lose from the failure of the other 34,000 Tokyo doctors
to sort themselves among the remaining ﬁelds by talent. In other words, con-
sumers may well want their best doctors in some ﬁelds rather than others, but
the universal health insurance prevents them from sending the price signals
necessary to cause that sorting. Neither would consumers incur a large loss from
the fact that the 500 cosmetic surgeons invest heavily in specialized expertise.
Instead, they potentially lose from the failure of the other 34,000 to make anal-
ogous investments. In other words, consumers may well want their cardiologists
and oncologists to invest in specialized skills too, but the current system prevents
them from generating the price signals necessary to induce the investments.
7. Conclusions
In Japan, the government provides universal health insurance. Toward that
end, it heavily subsidizes demand. Yet, as in the United States, it also limits the
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supply of medical services with a rigidlicensingrequirement.Subsidizingdemand
while limiting supply raises market prices, and the Japanese government keeps
costs down by suppressing prices by ﬁat. One effect is obvious and has been
often noted: suppliers depreciate quality. Much the way that landlords let apart-
ments deteriorate in rent-controlled cities, doctors depreciate quality in worlds
with suppressed prices.
But the distortions caused by the cost suppression under universal health
insurance are more basic, for they affect the very career choices physicians make.
More speciﬁcally, they create an incentive for the most talented doctors to opt
for sectors beyond the price controls, to invest in human capital speciﬁc to those
sectors, and to certify that sector-speciﬁc expertise. Ironically, most of the sectors
excluded from the Japanese insurance scheme are those deemed the least med-
ically “necessary,” and cosmetic surgery is one. Ironically, the price distortions
drive the brightest Japanese doctors into cosmetic surgery, where they invest
heavily in cosmetic expertise and certify that expertise to a level never seen in
the medically necessary sectors.
Cosmetic surgeons earn high incomes in the United States as well of course.
In large part, their incomes represent the returns on the human capital invest-
ments they make in their specialty. The point is not that Japanese cosmetic
surgeons earn a premium unavailable here. The point is that by operating beyond
the scope of the universal health insurance, they can proﬁtably do what so few
other Japanese physicians can cost-effectively do: earn a return on their talent
and invest in ﬁeld-speciﬁc training.
In most Japanese medical ﬁelds, price controls preclude physicians from earn-
ing large enough returns on their training to make any serious specialization
worthwhile. In cosmetic surgery, however, Japanese physicians face a competitive
market. In response to the market price signals, they specialize, train, and certify
their expertise. In virtually every other ﬁeld, they do not.
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